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Harsanyi Purification Theorem


Theorem

Informal statement (Harsanyi, 1973). Let GG be a finite normal-form game with payoffs vi(a)v_i(a), and let σ∗\sigma^* be a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of GG. For ε>0\varepsilon>0 consider the perturbed Bayesian game G(ε)G(\varepsilon) in which player ii's payoff is

vi(a)+ε θia,v_i(a)+\varepsilon\,\theta_i^{a},

where the perturbation vector θi=(θia)a∈A\theta_i=(\theta_i^a)_{a\in A} is player ii's privately observed type, drawn from a distribution with a continuous density, independently across players. Then, for generic GG (more precisely, for every regular equilibrium σ∗\sigma^*), there are equilibria of G(ε)G(\varepsilon) such that

  • almost every type of every player has a unique best action, so the equilibrium is in pure strategies, and
  • the probability with which each player's equilibrium strategy, viewed from outside, chooses each action converges to σi∗\sigma_i^* as ε→0\varepsilon\to0.

So every such mixed equilibrium is the limit of pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria of slightly perturbed games of incomplete information.


Interpretation

In a mixed equilibrium each player is indifferent between the actions she mixes over, so it is unclear why she would randomize with exactly the equilibrium probabilities. Purification answers: she need not randomize at all. Small private payoff differences break her indifference one way or the other; an opponent who does not observe them sees a player whose action is random, with probabilities that approach the mixed equilibrium.

Top: types of the perturbed chicken game split at the cutoff 0.3125 into S and T. Bottom: the probability q of T, which tends to the mixed-equilibrium value 1/3 as ε falls.

The figure uses the chicken game of the Examples. At the top, ε=0.1\varepsilon=0.1: every type plays a pure action, SS below the cutoff θ∗=0.3125\theta^*=0.3125 and TT above it, so an opponent who does not see θi\theta_i observes TT with probability (1−θ∗)/2=0.34375(1-\theta^*)/2=0.34375. Below, this probability q=(1+ε)/(3+2ε)q=(1+\varepsilon)/(3+2\varepsilon) is plotted against ε\varepsilon; as the perturbation shrinks it falls to 13\tfrac{1}{3}, the probability of TT in the mixed equilibrium of the unperturbed game.

Shrink ε\varepsilon: every type still plays a pure action, but the cutoff θ∗\theta^* moves towards 13\tfrac13 and the share of TT falls to the mixed-equilibrium value 13\tfrac13.

The limiting probabilities are pinned down by the opponents' incentives, not by the player's own. In the perturbed game, player jj's probability of an action must leave player ii's cutoff type exactly indifferent; as ε→0\varepsilon\to0 this forces it towards the value that makes ii indifferent in GG, as in the indifference principle for mixed strategies.

The theorem is about limits of equilibria of nearby games, not about every perturbation of every game; nongeneric games can have mixed equilibria that cannot be purified.


Key Results

  • Pure strategies in G(ε)G(\varepsilon) are type-contingent: typically a cutoff rule "choose action xx if and only if θi\theta_i is above a threshold".
  • The induced action distribution of player ii converges to σi∗\sigma_i^* as ε→0\varepsilon\to0.
  • Pure Nash equilibria of GG that are strict are also approximated by equilibria of G(ε)G(\varepsilon), in which almost all types play the pure action.
  • In the theorem the perturbations are private (each player observes only her own θi\theta_i) and independent across players; these are hypotheses, and the conclusion is not claimed without them.

Examples

The chicken game illustrates the construction. Actions are SS (swerve) and TT (go straight), with v(S,S)=(0,0)v(S,S)=(0,0), v(S,T)=(−1,1)v(S,T)=(-1,1), v(T,S)=(1,−1)v(T,S)=(1,-1), v(T,T)=(−3,−3)v(T,T)=(-3,-3). If the opponent plays TT with probability qq, SS yields −q-q and TT yields 1−4q1-4q, so the symmetric mixed equilibrium has q=13q=\tfrac{1}{3}.

Perturbed game. Add εθi\varepsilon\theta_i to player ii's payoff from TT, with θi\theta_i having the uniform distribution on [−1,1][-1,1], independently and privately. Type θi\theta_i prefers TT if and only if 1−4q+εθi≥−q1-4q+\varepsilon\theta_i\ge-q, i.e. θi≥θ∗=(3q−1)/ε\theta_i\ge\theta^*=(3q-1)/\varepsilon. In a symmetric equilibrium q=P(θj≥θ∗)=(1−θ∗)/2q=\mathbb{P}(\theta_j\ge\theta^*)=(1-\theta^*)/2. Solving,

θ∗=13+2ε,q=1+ε3+2ε.\theta^*=\frac{1}{3+2\varepsilon},\qquad q=\frac{1+\varepsilon}{3+2\varepsilon}.

For ε=0.1\varepsilon=0.1: θ∗=0.3125\theta^*=0.3125 and q=0.34375q=0.34375. Every type plays a pure action (the cutoff type has probability 0), and q→13q\to\tfrac{1}{3} as ε→0\varepsilon\to0.


Prerequisites



Sources

Aliases: purification theorem, Harsanyi purification, purification of mixed equilibria Keywords: perturbed payoffs, payoff perturbations, private payoff shocks, interpretation of mixed strategies, cutoff strategy, epsilon to zero Symbols: element of, epsilon, sigma, theta

Last updated: 16 October 2026 22:28